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By Leons Gabriels Taivans
I am thankful to Paul Crego, Ph.D., for his critical remarks. They were dealing with my
brief anthropological insight into the Georgian Orthodox Church members’ work and entrepreneur
activity according to Weberian methodology. An academic journal is a sort of lab, where scholars
have a chance to discuss their ideas and dispute their research approaches. Each discussion,
therefore, is beneficial and fruitful.
Dr. Crego complained that I have compared oranges with apples:
When he finds a Protestant ethic in the Republic of Georgia, he has imposed this idea on a
society that is largely innocent of this system of thought. In my opinion, there is also an
overgeneralization in terms of privileging Calvinism and its theology and ethics as
somehow prototypical of Protestantism. 1
My answer would be as follows. The contemporary interpretation of the theory of
economic conduct under the influence of religion has greatly changed from the times, when, as Dr.
Crego states, “economic success [was understood] as a sign of God’s grace and salvation.” 2 The
contemporary Weberian approach long ago has crossed the borderlines of confessions and even
religions. It is especially important when we discuss Georgia, which, according to Bernard Lewis,
is the part of Middle East. 3 The closest neighbor of Georgia is Turkey, and both countries have a
few social and economic parallels intertwined with their EU aspirations, past and present.
The main characteristic of the Turkish economy from the proclamation of the Republic in
1923 was that the economy was planned by the state and bureaucrats with almost no civil or private
initiatives. This might be considered as the reason why the small and middle enterprises stayed at
lower levels for a long time in Turkey. Since 1923 Georgia also had a state-planned economy and
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bureaucrats were the dominating economic force like that of Turkey. Despite the state dominance
in the economy during the decades of Soviet rule, Georgia’s population enjoyed considerable
concessions, such as catering enterprises, small production shops, personal auxiliary farms, and
other small economic unit thus creating a sort of “dual economy.” 4
Things greatly changed for Turkey in the 1980s, when Turgut Özal, the chief economic
bureaucrat, then Prime Minister, and finally President of Turkey started the change and
transformation process in his country. His liberal economy policies provided the basis for
transforming the economic structure from a state-oriented economy to a free market. Özal was
trying to encourage people to set up their businesses and create an enterprise culture. Besides
institutional changes, moral transformation played a vital role in his process. The religious
movements benefited from this period's liberal politics and gained more power. It has been claimed
that the increasing number of pious businesspeople and their religious business associations are
still the by-products of the liberal policies of Turgut Özal. 5
Georgia followed the path of Turkey several decades later. In 1990 the disintegration of
the Soviet Union began the economically heavy transitional period. In 2005, the reforms initiated
by the government of M. Saakashvili eliminated mafia gangs, 6 and Georgia could turn to economic
activity like that of Turkey. Georgia exposed a very high level of religiosity which I mentioned in
my previous article. The exclusive role of religion could trigger economic conduct like that of
Turkey. Additionally, the Turkish model provided a lot of academic interest.
Newly emerging pious businesspeople became a subject of academic studies about Islam
and business following the Weberian methodology contrary to suggestions by Dr. Crego. Weber’s
Protestant ethic thesis stressed the relationship between religion (in the case of Turkey - Islam)
and business activities, the Islamic or Muslim ethic concerning work-related attitudes, and
business activities. 7 This approach was supported by the "Islamic work ethic" research that had
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been conducted in other Muslim countries. 8 Barro and McCleary, for instance, argued that religion
is an important dimension of culture and, based on a sample of 59 countries, found that church
attendance and religious beliefs affected economic growth not necessarily in Protestant or
Christian societies only. 9 In addition, Mehanna examined the role of religion on international trade
and found a significant impact. 10 Bartke and Schwarze found that religious faith shows a strong
influence on risk propensity and that specific religion affiliations explain different risk attitudes. 11
Furthermore, other scholars, for instance, R. M. McCleary presented theoretical explanations
regarding the role of religion in economic development. 12 Weber, with others following, argued
that differences in entrepreneurial activity can be explained by cultural and religious factors,
specifically the society's acceptance of the Calvinist work ethic undervalued by Dr. Crego. 13
Moreover, religious values became motivators for the economic behavior of religious
people and their descendants, even if the religious leaders did not expect this type of historical
outcome. A lack of wide systematic cross-country empirical analysis of the impact of various
religions on the forces that feed economic activity in Georgia doesn’t mean that Georgian
churchgoers are, as Dr. Crego insists, “largely innocent of this [Protestant] system of thought.” 14
The skepticism by Dr. Crego is obvious because the influence of religious factors on
entrepreneurship is a poorly understood phenomenon and this relationship is complex and indirect.
The theoretical perspectives on this issue are not developed enough, and current empirical data are
scarce. Moreover, the relationship between religion and entrepreneurship, at the individual level,
is interdependent and affected by a wide range of additional factors such as personality, ethnicity,
network structures, education, and risk attitude. 15 This relation is also interdependent at the macro
level and affected by the political regime and national cultural factors.
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Thus Huntington 16 and Landes 17 argue that the Protestant work ethics influenced large numbers of
people to engage in work in the secular world, developing their enterprises, engaging in trade, and
accumulation of wealth. Moreover, Becker and Woessmann found that Protestantism led to a
higher educational level, which positively influenced economic growth and entrepreneurship
level. 18 Elements of Protestant ethics were exploited even by Soviet ideologists to activate
economic performance. 19
The religious enthusiasm of Georgians followed another path, which was paved to a great
extent by Soviet intellectual opposition. In the 1970s scholarly literature earned great popularity
which aimed to rehabilitate religion as an element of culture and statehood. Contrary to outdated
Marxist theory religion it was praised as an ideology that helped to establish Russian statehood at
its initial stage. Georgian intellectuals followed the trend and created several literary and scholarly
works relating to the medieval history of Georgia. 20 In the 1990s the church began to fill the
ideological vacuum left by the collapse of state socialism. When Georgia regained independence
in 1991, the vast majority of the country’s population consisted of Orthodox Georgians, and they
wanted to quickly get rid of the Soviet legacy. They saw the church as an important resource for
the formation of a new identity and the restoration of lost statehood. In a young post-Soviet state
that otherwise lacked a consistent state ideology, indoctrination by the church was easy. The
concept of a Georgian as a person who belongs to the Georgian ethnos and church—that is,
Orthodoxy—began to spread. After independence, both the number of parishioners and priests
grew. As a result, the inculcated ideology of “Georgian-ness” began to rely on a solid infrastructure
of churches, dioceses, and parish priests, with the State-Church Concordat (2002) serving as an
important legal backup. 21
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Unlike Western churches, the Georgian Orthodox Church was bypassed by Medieval
Western monasticism, Renaissance, and the Enlightenment. After Georgia regained independence
in 1991, it never underwent post-totalitarian reforms. The main source of the Georgian Orthodox
Church’s conservatism is its Orthodox doctrine. However, Orthodoxy as such does not contradict
a society’s goals of modernization and Europeanization, as is evidenced by other European
Orthodox countries, such as Bulgaria and Greece.
Thus, for instance, Gotsis, Kortezi, and Katselidis conceptualized the potential benefits of
creating social capital derived from the Greek Orthodox work ethic and theology. 22 As a result,
they expect positive effects, mainly through various cultural transmissions of Greek Orthodoxy,
on the entrepreneurial process. Sherman documented a positive effect of religious orthodoxy upon
both the attitudes and actions favorable to economic progress. 23 Dana Tassioupulos argues that
Greek Orthodoxy fosters a work ethic and leadership style that may facilitate successful
entrepreneurship. 24 The case of Greek Orthodoxy has been scholarly analyzed, but this is not the
case of Georgian Orthodoxy yet. The reason is much the same as I mentioned in my article: the
nearly two hundred years of Russian yoke. The Georgian Orthodox Church considers itself the
only defender of Georgia’s national values, which are diverse and hard to define; the church has
never been able to define a precise theological basis for its conservatism. 25
Dr. Crego stresses the opposition of the Orthodox Church to Russians, but this is not the
subject of my article. What I wanted to say is that the Georgian Orthodox Church never developed
its own theology. The Protestant ethic and Turkish Muslim ethic (developed by Fethullah Gülen,
for instance) is at least the outcome of theological thought. When I speak of the isolation of GOC,
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the development of theology was the subject, not the occasional contact with the monks of Athos,
or various monasteries in Constantinople.
Finally, some words should be said concerning the incorporation of the Caucasus into the
Russian Empire. I completely agree with Dr. Crego concerning the history of resistance against
Russian rule. It was a profound shock to the cultural traditions of Caucasian people in many ways.
In the Caucasus, Russia saw itself as a great modernizing force, forcibly wrenching these
communities into the modern world. It sought to undermine any state or religion that worked
against its global strategic interests. In some places, this meant extinguishing preexisting
autonomous church structures, as when it abolished the ancient autocephalous Georgian
patriarchate soon after its conquest in 1801; Georgian bishops were henceforth merely part of the
Russian Orthodox Holy Synod. It also meant cultural conformity: many Georgian and Armenian
churches were whitewashed because Russian churches were not riots of color like the Caucasian
Christian churches traditionally were, often destroying beautiful medieval frescoes. Moreover,
under Russian rule, the ecclesiastic independence of the Georgian Orthodox Church was abolished,
and the Russian language was thoroughly imposed both in civil and clerical spheres; something
that never happened before, even during the brief Byzantine influence. The result of ecclesiastic
imperialism was the reduction of the spiritual energy from economic performance towards the
establishment of Georgian statehood and political independence.
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